Extending the Circle of Rights

This week we considered the question: should the circle of rights be extended to include animals and plants? That is, should animals and plants be granted certain unconditional moral or legal entitlements? There are a range of views in the literature:

(1) Feinberg (1974) argues that animals should have rights but plants should not.
(2) Stone (1972) argues that some plants and natural environments should have rights.
(3) Hayward (1998) argues that the circle of rights should not be extended, but that ecological values should be enshrined in our social constitutions, as a natural extension of the logic of human rights.
(4) Attfield (1981) argues that plants cannot be rights bearers but that they can nevertheless be said to have 'interests' and 'value of their own'.

All four articles were interesting, but for now I'll just consider the following proposal by Feinberg (1974):

Interest Principle
The beings who can have rights are precisely those who can have interests.

I think that 'interests' may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral standing. Here are two definitions of 'interest':

1. the advantage or benefit of a person or group
2. a stake, share, or involvement in an undertaking, esp. a financial one

We can talk of animal or even plant 'interest' in the sense of both (1) and (2). What about the 'interest' of a river? If a plant's interests include striving towards the sun, absorbing nutrients and reproducing, do a river's interests include flowing downhill and out to sea? The ascription of 'interests' seems to be a case merely of teleological interpretation, and not a description of metaphysical fact. We look at these entities and ascribe certain 'goals' to them on the basis of their behaviour. We should be hesitant about taking these characterisations to be literally or metaphysically true.

What would it be for an ascription of 'interests' to be literally true? For plants and rivers to really have goals? Well, I think we consider interest ascription to animals to be 'more' true, and interest ascription to humans even more so.The notion of goals - and thus 'interests' in the sense relevant to moral standing - is closely related to psychology, to the concepts of mental states and intentionality. We might therefore refer to these more general debates in the philosophy of mind (e.g.. Dennett's 'intentional stance') in the hope of clarifying the kinds of beings that can have 'interests'.

Traditionally, moral theories have considered the capacity for 'intentional' behaviour to be a necessary and sufficient condition for moral standing. It seems that Stone (1972) is trying to move away from the idea of intentionality as unique characteristic of the mental. It strikes me that if we take an anti-realist view on intentionality* then we can't possibly use it as the basis for moral consideration. And of course, if we take a spectral view then any moral theory which refers to intentionality will of course need to specify the order of interpretation at which story about 'interests' becomes morally relevant.

The worries about this approach have somewhat reinforced my inclination towards moral non-cognitivism, or at least the view that emotional ties to things provide the basis for giving them moral consideration.

Notes:
* Dennett (1989) rejects the label anti-realism, taking intentional idiom to pick out 'real patterns' in the natural world. But, I think that refusing to recognise intentionality at the ontological level counts as anti-realism in a certain sense. In any case, I think the intentional stance has to amount to a spectral view of intentionality - it's not an all or nothing concept, just a way of understanding complex objects (e.g. in particular, humans). So, his view is still likely to give traditional moral theorists a headache.

References:
Attfield, R. (1981) 'The Good of Trees', Journal of Value Inquiry 15, pp.35-54
Dennett, D. (1989) The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press)
Feinberg, J. (1974) 'The Rights of Animals', in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis,  Blackstone, W. (ed.) (Athens: University of Georgia Press)
Stone, C. (1972) 'Should Trees Have Standing', in University of Southern California Law Review 45, pp. 450-501
Hayward, T. (1998) 'Political Theory for a Sustainable Polity' in Political Theory and Ecological Values (Polity Press)

Instrumental vs Relational Value

I just realised I've been using 'instrumental value' in two different ways pretty much ever since I started thinking philosophically. To bring this out I will attempt two definitions:

1. An entity or state of affairs has instrumental value iff it is valuable a means of achieving a certain desideratum, or a series of desiderata.
   
2. An entity or state of affairs has relational value iff its value depends on its relation to other entities or states of affairs.

Are these definitions co-extensive? Well, instrumental value is clearly a species of relational value, but we might think there relational values which aren't properly called instrumental. Let's consider two examples:

(a) a Van Gogh painting
(b) a letter from a friend

Both clearly have relational value: their importance is dependent upon their relation to a group of human beings. But do they have instrumental value? Well, the Van Gogh might do: if you have a gallery it might attract patrons, if you are its owner it might function as a status symbol. Nevertheless, even once these factors have been accounted for, I would suggest there is some extra kind of valuing left over.

To make this kind clearer let's turn to the letter from a friend and suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is something you keep privately; the only people who know about it are you and its author. You value the letter highly, and resolve to keep it on your person until you die. Isn't your attachment to it an end in itself, not a means to an end? If so, then the letter possesses relational but non-instrumental value.

How to describe the foil we've revealed here? I'm tempted to label it 'intrinsic value', but skim-re-reading Weatherson (2008) suggests I shouldn't: it connotes a strong sense of self-subsistence which would make it seem non-relational. I also thought about 'independent value', in the sense of not depending on another value, though still, of course, upon a valuer (if it's a species of relational value). Finally, I wonder about 'fundamental' or 'founding' or 'basic' value, in so far as such values are presupposed by the notion of instrumental value, for I take it that they play the role of defining our desiderata. That is to say, it is our non-instrumental values which animate our pursuit of instrumental value.

But aren't our desiderata themselves always, ultimately, instrumental? I think that there is a certain sense in which this is true but an important context in which this is false, namely that of motivation. To foreground the Darwinian flavour of this question, let's imagine a couple enjoying contraceptive sex. From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, we can explain their attraction towards this activity in terms of the paradigmatic 'desideratum' of genetic evolution; the propogation of genes. ( I place 'desideratum' in inverted commas, because, of course, natural selection is a blind effect of physical forces, not a volitional agent; thus not a literal subject of 'desires'. ) An ultimate explanation* of the couple's sexual desires can be given in a way which makes them look instrumental: in the context of a theory of genetic evolution we can say that these desires were selected for because of their instrumental value. But, speaking proximately, that is, in terms of the motivations of the agents themselves, contraceptive sex is clearly enjoyed for its own sake, not as a means of achieveing a further desideratum.

To return to the two ways in which I've been using instrumental value, let me take another example. In a discussion of environmental ethics, we might ask, for example: why we should save a particular natural landscape from destruction by property developers? The tensions in such a debate will arise due to a complex set of competing values, and within this set there will be discerned different types of value. The developer will justify her proposal in terms of instrumental value: she wants to harness the economic potential of the land. Those who oppose her proposal may cite instrumental reasons of a similar kind, such as the economic benefits that such a landscape brings to the community. In such a case they engage with the developer on her own terms, and show that leaving the land as it is is the better option economically. But, more likely, they will suggest that the landscape possess other kinds of value, which should be respected, or at least considered as part of the trade off. These values might be labelled 'aesthetic' or 'spiritual'; they are those which we enjoy when we talk a walk in the country, for example. But, thought I, isn't this attempt to cite non-instrumental values ultimately self-defeating: though we are now in the domain of non-economic values, we nevertheless remain within that of instrumental values - we've now assumed desiderata such as human happiness or spiritual well-being, and given the land value as a means to achieving these.

Any approach which remains within the terms of instrumental value seems somewhat unsatisfactory: if some other means of achieving our ends were available, say, for example, a virtual experience machine, then according to this approach we would no longer have any reason to preserve the natural landscape in question. There's an obvious intuitive resistance here; something about this conclusion feels wrong. Should we just bite this bullet, or is there a problem with the argument? Well, I'd like to suggest a diagnosis: namely that we have moved away from the proximate question 'how** do we as individuals value the landscape?' to the broader question 'why do we as a society value the landscape'? In this shift, we loose the crucial context of an individual valuing human subject - with all its rational and emotional complexities - and instead gravitate towards the abstract conception of a 'rational' society, composed of institutions that act and are founded solely upon intelligible reasons, not in terms of affective attachments. On most substantive (i.e. non-procedural) conceptions, their goal is to abstract from the affective to find common, intelligible, 'objective' values - but if my non-cognitivism about 'basic' values is correct, this is a rather misdirected project, that may well encourage a sterile instrumentalist mindset which fails to consider ethical questions in a genuinely human context.***

Notes:
* I'm inspired by Pinker (2003)'s ultimate / proximate distinction in this context.
** I write 'how' rather than 'why' because I think that most of the relevant valuations (e.g. the non-instrumental ones) are not amenable to 'why' questions, which ask for justification in terms of reasons; I take them to be emotional, i.e. irrational.
*** Perhaps a partial antidote to the problem suggested here would be to rephrase the broader question posed to society - in terms of a more descriptive 'how' instead of an (overly-)explanation-seeking 'why'?

References:
Pinker, S. (2003) The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, (London: Penguin Books Ltd)
Weatherson, B. (2008) "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic/>.

Why might it be dangerous to hold a physicalist view of nature?

Revising for today's mid-term, I made a mental note to return to the question: Why may it be dangerous to view nature as a mechanical system?

To begin by clarifying the question, I take this to be referring to a view concerning the constitution of the mind-independent world, namely that it is mechanistic, or systematic, or at least somewhat conceptually constituted. With these inelegant formulations, I'm struggling to substantively characterise the view expressed by physicalism, namely that nature really is constituted by the fundamental entities which physics describes (or attempts to describe).

So, I'll reframe the question as follows:

Why might it be dangerous to hold a physicalist view of nature?
Well, I'd like to consider this from the perspective of Husserl Crisis (1954). In the wonderfully-titled first section, he writes of 'The Crisis of the Sciences as the Expression of the Radical Life-Crisis of European Humanity'. In brief, he describes the problem as follows: the scientific quest for objective knowledge has led to a forgetfulness, which concerns two closely related phenomena: subjectivity and the life-world.  The sciences, Husserl charges, have forgotten the everyday life-world upon which they are based, and have conseqently become groundless. At the same time, they have become the dominant discourse in European society, such that they strongly determine the way that 'European humanity' looks at the world. As a result, we find ourselves in a situation where science is incapable of addressing all questions 'ultimate and highest'; where it cannot address questions which concern us in our living existence; particularly, I think, questions concerning non-instrumental values. According to Husserl, the positivistic conception 'decaptitates philosophy', because it fails to recognise the proper concern of the discipline, which is to consider questions 'of a higher dignity than questions of fact'. Accordingly, the crisis of science is revealed in 'the loss of its meaning for life.'

How did this situation come about? In brief, Husserl takes the sciences to have emerged from the insight that there is a difference between the manifold appearances of an object to a subject and the single unified object which lies behind these appearances. From the outset, science has been concerned primarily with proceeding from the experience of former to knowledge of the latter. Galileo cemented the final foundation for the 20th century crisis: his seminal work effectively ushered in what Husserl calls the 'mathematisation of nature'. From Galileo onwards, the ideal shapes of geometry were taken to be constitutive of reality (herein I'll call this the constitution assumption); the geometrical and mathematical truths of physics were taken to be the fundamental truths. The widespread view, since then, is that the ideal shapes of geometry and their representations in mathematics somehow reflect the true nature of reality. I think this view underwrites what we would now call physicalism.

In Husserl's words, the mathematisation of nature amounts to the view that 'the infinite totality of what is in general is intrinsically a rational all-encompassing unity that can be mastered, without anything left over, by a corresponding universal science.' Clearly, physicalism is an intellectually optimistic view, though it does not assume that such a final state of totalising mastery is actually realisable. Nevertheless, I can imagine Michael Morris, with an eye to John McDowell, suggesting that the basic thrust of such a hypothesis sounds rather idealistic.

Anyway, having pointed all this out, Husserl reminds us that, of course, we never actually experience the ideal shapes of geometry. They are abstractions from the life-world, which, according to Husserl, always contains a degree of indeterminacy. Perceptual objects are asymptotic in their progression towards the ideal, exact, geometrical object. Given this, we have reason to wonder how the constitution assumption which underwrites the physicalist view might be justified. In what I've read so far, Husserl does not consider how this might be argued for. * [ I'd like to research arguments for this view, perhaps I should read more McDowell. ]

In the meantime, we can remark that on this topic Husserl does ask 'is there not in the appearances themselves a content we must ascribe to true nature?' In other words, if we want to give a complete account of the natural world, do we not need to include both subjectivity and the life-world? If the answer is yes, and this cannot be done in a physical vocabulary, then we have a prima facie reason for rejecting the constitution assumption, ergo, physicalism. Here we rejoin the contemporary debate regarding the problem of consciousness, which I'm inclined to consider pretty 'hard'. (c.f. Chalmers (1995))

Why might physicalism be dangerous? Well, problems potentially arise from its neglect of the life-world as mentioned earlier. If it neglects or surpresses its origin in the life-world, then it forgets its originating purpose, as a creation of, and instrument for, the subject. Unless it is seen as such, science may come to dominate the subject, and humanity more broadly, and consequently lead to the neglect of important non-factual, perhaps non-cognitive, discussions concerning 'higher' questions.** If a pragmatic scientific mindset comes to be unduly dominant, it could lead to a severe impoverishment of humanity, of which technologism would be a symptom.

In short, I think the moral of the Crisis is this: remember that it is the life-world which gives rise to science, that the pursuit of science presupposes the normative horizon of meaning found within the life-world. Without the animating normative context of the life-world, science could not exist. In our understandable enthusiasm for scientific progress we should not neglect other important questions which present themselves to us, in particular those fundamental ones concerning non-instrumental value. The danger, writes Husserl, is that 'merely fact-minded sciences make merely fact-minded people.' And that, we might think, would be nothing less than the end of humanity.


Notes:
* Nietzsche (1885), discussing this topic, writes in Zarathustra 'What urges you on and arouses your ardour, you wisest of men, do you call it 'will to truth?' Will to the conceivability of all being: that is what I call your will! You first want to make all being conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and accommodate itself to you! [...] It must become smooth and subject to the mind as the mind's mirror and reflection.'

** It's not that physicalism precludes such discussions - many claim, for example, that the view is compatible with realism about other levels of description including moral discourse. I'm yet to see how this could work however, basically finding myself in agreement with Kim (1989) in my dissatisfaction with purportedly non-reductive 'supervenience' accounts.

References:
Chalmers, D. (1995) 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness', Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 200-19 [ available at URL = http://consc.net/papers/facing.html ]

Husserl, E. (1954) The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970) [ extracts available at URL = http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/husserl.htm ]

Kim, J. (1989) ‘The Myth of Non-Reductive Materialism’, Proceedings and Addresses of the     American Philosophical Association, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 31-47.

Nietzche, F. (1885) Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Hollingdale, R. J. (trans.) (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1969), p. 136

Snow in Reykjavik

Well, despite a slightly pressed weekend of cramming, I feel like today's mid-term went well. Rather fittingly, I enjoyed a wonderful natural-aesthetic experience on leaving the exam hall - the first sprinkling of snow in Reykjavik.

From now on I'll be posting at weekly intervals, summarising and commenting upon each week's reading. At some point I'll also post the presentation Christopher, Bjork and I gave on Murray Bookchin's criticisms of Deep Ecology.

Yuriko Saito 'Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms'

 “Listening to nature as nature, must involve recognizing its own reality apart from us.(…) Appreciating nature on its own terms, therefore, must be based upon listening to a story nature tells of itself through all its perceptual features; that is, a story concerning its origin, make-up, function and working, independent of human presence or involvement” (Yuriko Saito)

Saito (2004) is arguing for an aesthetic appreciation of nature which goes beyond anthropic self-projection, to an appreciation of truly mind-independent nature. Like Carlson (2008), she is a realist who wants to ground the aesthetic appreciation of nature objectively, that is, in mind-independent nature itself. For them both, aeshetic appreciation involves more than just creating aesthetic values, it involves recognising them in the natural world as such. Like Carlson, Saito thinks that we can look to the natural sciences for advice on how to appreciate nature aesthetically; after all, on the typical realist conception, its founding aim is to consider nature on its own terms. Unlike Carlson, however, Saito also accepts the relevance of non-scientific discourses, such as those of folklore and tradition. She is also sympathetic to non-cognitive attempts to enage with nature on its own terms - I take 'all perceptual features' to be suggestive of this broadly permissive view. While Carlson holds a cognitive realist view, Saito is a non-cognitive realist.

Saito's environmental aesthetic seems to be underwritten by a sense of moral obligation to consider nature on its own terms. She writes:

“the appropriate appreciation of nature must include the moral capacity for acknowledging the reality of nature apart from humans and the sensitivity for listening to its own story”

Her view agrees with Leopold's insofar as she is endorsing an ethical relationship with nature 'apart from humans', which I take to mean an ethical relationship with nature as such, rather than a merely anthropocentric ethical relationship with nature (e.g. one in which nature is respected as a communal good for humans).

This makes me wonder about the relationship between an environmental ethic and an environmental aesthetic - might one serve as a ground for the other, or might they at least be mutually reinforcing?  Another second question: is it reasonable to assume that 'nature's story' has an aesthetic value? Nature red in tooth and claw can look rather bleak indeed, as can the cold indifferent material universe. Yet naturalists often talk of 'wonder' at the complexity and diversity of natural processes. I've not considered this topic much, but my immediate response is: 'well, it depends how you look at it.' But this indicates a subjectivism about aesthetic judgements which I do not think either Saito or Carlson would be happy with.

References:
Carlson, A. (2008) "Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment” in Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism. Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press)
Saito, Y. (2004) “Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms” in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments, Berleant & Carlson (eds.) (Broadview Press)

Aldo Leopold on an Ethical Relationship to Land

 “It is inconceivable to me that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, and admiration for land, and a high regard for it’s value. By value, I of course mean something far broader than mere economic value; I mean value in the philosophical sense.“ (Aldo Leopold)

Leopold (1981) sees the development of an emotional relationship with land as a precondition for an ethical relationship with it. A cold blooded materialist might express scepticism about the idea of an emotional or an ethical relationship of the kind Leopold envisages. How, she might ask, could we develop an emotional attachment to indifferent, inanimate matter? Well, along with the insights of psychology, recent work in the phenomenology of space and place has further revealed just how deep our emotional relationships to our living environments can become. Last easter I read an article by a former tutor, Dylan Trigg, entitled 'Anonymous Materiality', in which he gave a phenomenological account of the return to a childhood home, which highlighted, among other things, the spectacle of the formerly intimate and friendly family home now appearing indifferent and anonymous, in its cold materiality. In short, human beings emphatically do create and maintain deep emotional relationships to space and place, though of course, these relationships are one-sided. We might remark further, that although these relationships may be emotionally negative, it is typically an affectionate relationship that develops towards the environments which reliably provide sustenance.

Granting the possibility of such emotional relationships, we can now ask why they would be a pre-condition for an ethical relationship. I think the answer is made fairly clear by analogy with ethical relationships between humans, which themselves seem to be largely based upon emotions such as compassion, empathy and love. It would almost seem like a commonplace to assert that ethical relationships are based on emotions rather than calculations.

So, we can now see why the instrumentalist view of nature, which is based on rational estimations of utility, is considered by Leopold, among others, to be fundamentally non-ethical. Perhaps such an attitude is also unethical (I take this latter to be a pejorative label, while 'non-ethical' is merely descriptive). The confirmation of this 'perhaps' will depend on the question of whether we 'ought' to hold an ethical relationship with nature - whether we should play up or play down our latent emotional relationships with it. Arguing for a Leopoldian response to this question could be done on the grounds of pragmatics - but to do this would be self-defeating, to remain within an instrumental perspective. The question is whether we should cultive a non-instrumental relationship with nature, and any answer of the form 'yes, so that...' fails to answer the question. I think the most promising approach, for a Leopoldian, may be that suggested by Thomas Hill (1983), which is to address the question somewhat indirectly, through the lens of virtue ethics. If virtues are characteristics we consider valuable in themselves, then we should not be surprised by our inability to supply satisfactory reasons for valuing them. In the present context, we might ask: would the kind of person we admire be someone who maintains an ethical relationship to the land?

References:
Hill, T. (1983) 'Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments', Environmental Ethics 5, pp.211-24
Leopold, A. (1981) 'The Land Ethic' in A Sand County Almanac, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.237-65 

Henry David Thoreau on Simplicity

Thoreau (1854) says that people “try to solve the problem of a livelihood by a formula more complicted than the problem itself”. What does that mean?

The problem of a livelihood is simply the problem of how to satisfy one's physical needs, how to respond to the necessities of life. Thoreau argues that the problem of a livelihood is much more straightforward than is commonly thought. Really, he thinks, it is a simple problem which admits of a simple solution. Accordingly, Thoreau's 'poor' are those who 'try to solve the problem of a livelihood by a formula more complicated than the problem itself,' that is those who supply an overcomplicated response to the problem of a livelihood.

Thoreau takes such overcomplication to be widespread. According to him, it is due to a number of factors including:

(1) moralism - a sense of guilt arises if we don't work hard
(2) lack of imagination - what else could we do?
(3) false needs - we mistake 'wants' for 'needs', and so become dominated by our own desires

I think an evolutionary psychologist would add 'striving for status' to this list.

According to Thoreau (1854) we commonly live as we do because we think we have no choice. Explain what he means by that.

Thoreau laments the predominance of so called 'false needs', which give rise to the impression that our existence is necessarily far more arduous than it in fact has to be. He takes people in general to work far too hard, far beyond the minimum effort required a modest and happy livelihood. Thoreau thinks that people suffer from an overinflated conception of what they need, coming to view many luxury or 'desired' items as outright necessities. As a result, they become locked into painful striving for these luxuries - for they feel obliged to possess them - and their lives are passed away in endless toil. People forget how relatively little effort is needed to live, and end up being dominated by their work. If they could see the error of their ways, they could choose to live much happier lives under the maxim of 'simplicity, simplicity, simplicity'.

References:
Thoreau, H. (1854) 'Economy' in Walden and Other Essays, [ URL = http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/thoreau/wa01_economy ]

Páll Skúlason on Technologism

What is wrong with technologism? Explain the difference between technology and technologism. What is the best way to proceed in order to overcome technologism according to you?

Skulason (2005) takes technology to refer practical knowledge, tools and machinery, and methods of achieving practical tasks. He notes that technology in all three senses presupposes a predetermined set of objectives, in the service of which technology is employed.

Skulason defines technologism as the exclusive focus on technological (i.e. practical) knowledge, at the expense of intellectual and moral knowledge. This leads to a privileging of technical values above intellectual and moral values. This is problematic because, as noted, technology really only makes sense in the context of predetermined objectives. These, presumably, are supplied by our intellectual and moral values, and so the more these areas are impoverished the more our use of technology will lack direction. This is a worrying prospect - any powerful tool must be used carefully, not blindly. Technologism is a dangerous tendency in so far it inhibits our capacity to utilise technology for the ends we created it. As it increases in power it may end up dominating or even destroying us.

A good way to counteract technologism, according to me, would be to encourage critical and philosophical thought in the general population. The more frequently we pause to ask 'why are are we doing this?', the more likely we are to keep our practical activities aligned with our intellectual and moral values, and the more we will deem it worth spending time reflecting on these latter. I think it could also be helpful to promote holistic or 'big picture' thinking, and to push for the further development of national and international institutions to facilitate this.

References:
Skúlason, P. (2005) 'Questions of Technology' in Technology in Society, Society in Technology, edited by Edward H. Huijbens and Örn D. Jónsson. (Reykjavik: University of Iceland Press)

Wilderness

How has the concept of wilderness usually been defined in environmental ethics? What are the main arguments for using the concept of wilderness for the purposes of environmental protection and what are the main criticisms of this approach?

Wilderness has been defined as 'untouched' areas of the environment, which have born no or very little human influence in their recent history. Areas of wilderness are as they are independently of any human intentions, they exhibit the non-purposive strivings of the physical world, and of natural selection. The meaning of wilderness has changed over time: pre-19th century it had a largely negative connotation of danger, the unknown, the uninhabitable. Writers like Emerson, Thoreau and Muir, however, contributed to a shift in meaning whereby the concept became romanticised, becoming associated with escape from the artificial, a 'return' to nature offering spiritual renewal and the possibility of appreciating one's place in the cosmos.

The concept of wilderness has been appealed to by the preservation movement, which is concerned with maintaining certain natural environments in a particular state, rather than mere 'sustainable development'. This movement has tended to consider certain environments in certain states to possess a non-economic value which ought to be considered before we begin a sustained engagement with these areas. 'Wilderness' has offered one way of arguing for this, the basic idea being that (increasingly scare) wild environments are valuable in some non-economic sense, and should be given special consideration as such.

Krieger (1973) has argued that wilderness will not serve the role that the preservation movement wants it to. As a social constructionist, he takes the concept to be socially contingent, and one which does not reflect any mind-independent natural kind. This has two consequences: firstly, the idea that wilderness is a human construct threatens the notion of its intrinsic value, rendering it valuable only relative to our  judgements. Secondly, and relatedly, Krieger claims that social engineering could be used to adjust our evaluative responses such that all the values recognised by the romantics could be experienced - even better experienced - in artificially created faux-natural landscapes.

Krieger's view sits comfortably with the mainstream American conservationist movement, namely that environmental policies should be based around a humanistic desirdatum: that of maximising human satisfactions and minimizing human harms. In all consideration of the environment, the effects on humanity are the primary concern. From this perspective, the concept of wildnerness is important only in so far it affects human beings; if we can artificially engineer a 'wilderness experience' which ticks all the right affective boxes, then so much for non-artificial wilderness.

I find this perspective fairly persuasive, but it nevertheless leaves me feeling a little uneasy. Would I trade the exploring the Icelandic highlands for a human created 'wilderness experience'?

Katz (1992) tries to discuss this worry. Drawing an analogy with art pieces, he takes the causal history of an object to be an important part of its value; the original is more valuable than a forgery. This is a good intuition pump, but I can imagine Krieger responding that we could socially re-engineer this attitude, or even simply lie to those who enter the wilderness experience, telling a false causal historical story which would elicit the same evaluative responses. Describing the value of wilderness in terms of the way human beings value it is to firmly remain within the framework of the anthropocentric consideration of the environment, and thus always open to the possibility of a 'non wild' substitute being submitted which better meets whatever evaluative criteria have been proposed.

Could we describe the value of wilderness in any other way? Well, Katz presents a second argument in which he takes wilderness to present a claim against human technological domination. The wild 'other' is resistent to the process of amalgamation into the anthropic world, its presence reminds us of the existence of things beyond ourselves.

I quite like the idea of the wild 'other', but can it do the work the preservationists want it to? Namely, can the wild 'other' of environmental philosophy be ascribed moral standing like the 'other' of sociology, politics and ethical philosophy more broadly? Only by ascribing it moral standing can we talk of the 'domination' of the wild in a negative light. Katz suggests that wilderness has moral standing in so far as it can also be considered as a self-realizing subject, not a mere passive object. He writes:

In the context of enviornmental philosophy, domination is the anthropocentric alteration of natural processes. The entities and systems of nature are not permitted to be free, to pursue their own independent and unplanned course of development.

Well, the obvious worry here is whether we can really consider 'the entities and systems of nature' as a subject. If their course of development is entirely non-intentional, unplanned, can they really be considered as such. The notion of 'self-realisation' is, to me, somewhat intentional. We have to ask: what makes the preservation of autonomy, of independent self-realisation morally desirable? Can we provide an answer which does not invoke the notion of purposive agency?

References:
Katz, E. (1992) 'The Call of the Wild', Environmental Ethics 14, pp. 265-73
Krieger, M. (1973) 'What's Wrong with Plastic Trees?', Science 179, pp. 446-55

Aldo Leopold 'Thinking Like a Mountain'

“Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of a wolf” Explain what Leopold (1981) means by this statement.

The paragraph from which this quote is taken begins by describing the ways in which various animals respond to the howl of the wolf: the deer, the coyote, the hunter. Each understands the howl in a different way, each associates it with different experiences relative to their ways of life. But, reads the sentence preceding the quotation, 'Behind these obvious and immediate hopes and fears there lies a deeper meaning, known only to the mountain itself.'

Leopold is obviously speaking metaphorically here, so its hard to determinately pin down what he is trying to say. I take the mountain to represent the land, the environment, while the wolf represents an  organism living within it. His point is that only the land, the basis of every ecosystem, can appreciate the true significance of an individual organism playing its role in the complex whole. Of course, I'm still in metaphor here. I'm not sure how to translate 'appreciate' into non-metaphorical terms, but the idea, I think, is to stress the overwhelming complexity of nature and ecological relations within it. Invoking the idea of 'listening objectively' recalls the idea of the view from nowhere, the non-subjective view, the mind-independent true state of affairs.

With this image, Leopold is trying to humble us in the face of nature, to remind us of its overwhelming complexity and longevity. He presents a warning to those who blithely claim to have unlocked its secrets, asking them to try engage with nature in a more holistic fashion, one which goes beyond their narrow interests by careful use of the imagination combined with insights from the natural sciences.

[ + emotion ]

References:
Leopold, A. (1981) 'The Land Ethic' in A Sand County Almanac, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.137-41

Aldo Leopold on Environmental Morality

Aldo Leopold (1981) says that morality is 'a limitation on freedom of action in the struggle for existence'. What does he mean by that?

Leopold gives a naturalist account of morality according to which moral behaviour is, ultimately, just another remarkable product of natural selection. Of course, it would probably be impossible to fully explain moral behaviour in terms of biology or ecology; we would need to have recourse to numerous disciplines including sociology, history, psychology, theology and philosophy. Nevertheless, general features of our moral behaviour - for example, reciprocial altruisim, kin preference, visceral reactions to certain acts - may be explained with reference to genetic selection and ancestral environments.

Moral constraints limit our freedom of action in so far as many acts which are physically possible are not performed due to their moral impossibility. As a result, the human being can reap the rewards of sustained co-operation; not least the development of complex social structures. Sometimes the constraint upon physical freedom may not be obvious, e.g. the idea of incest is, for most individuals, not attractive in the first place. In such cases, there is a close alignment between contemporary moral codes and hard-wired psychological traits. In many other cases, the alignment is less clear: we are certainly not hard-wired to always keep promises, but we very frequently do so nonetheless.

The upshot of such a view is that, broadly construed, our moral behaviour is emphatically not as the Christian ideal would have it - that is, fundamentally altruistic and non-instrumental. It is, rather, the opposite: a complex pursuit of self-interest. Furthermore, there is no set of eternal unchanging moral truths; what we consider to be moral behaviour will evolve over time. Leopold identifies two stages in the historical evolution of morality: an initial one in which moral codes dealt uniquely with relationships between individuals, then a subsequent development of moral codes for relating to society as a whole.
He suggests that there is a third stage of moral development which we should now be trying to realise, namely that we must expand our moral sphere once again, to include all aspects of nature, both animate and inanimate. That is to say, we should overcome our current land relation which is 'strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations', in favour of a framework which grants the land (the entire ecosystem) some kind of moral consideration. Interestingly, Leopold's grounds for this initially startling view seem to be anthropocentric - he describes such a move as 'an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity', which implies ominious consequences for our species should we fail to take this step. I'm not sure how else this 'necessity' could be intended.

On a first reading I took this article to be a bit nuts. Re-considering it now I find it a lot more interesting.

References:
Leopold, A. (1981) 'The Land Ethic' in A Sand County Almanac, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.237-65

Environmental Political Philosophy

Explain shortly what is involved in a problem-solving orientation?
A problem solving orientation focusses on particular real-world issues. It consults all the relevant parties, and does not begin with a rigid commitment to a particular ideology. Rather, it tries to mediate between the interested parties and develop a workable resolution to the problematic tensions. For the sake of efficiency, it considers only those local factors necessary for the resolution of the individual problem.

What characterizes a pragmatist view in environmental philosophy?
A pragmatist view tends to be instrumentalistic, concerned with the resolution of concrete specific problems rather than abstract "big picture" issues. Pragmatists are practically-minded, often empiricists.

What characterizes a pluralist view in environmental philosophy?
A moral pluralism holds that there are many different relatively moral frameworks. It is closely connected with cultural relativism. An environmental pluralism would presumably recognise that there are many different legitimate ways of addressing environmental problems, many different ways of assigning value.

Explain the collective nature of environmental problems?
Environmental problems tend to arise in the commons - a resource which is available for public use. They often arise due to the tragedy of the commons, a logic which has been studied in game theory. The basic problem is that individual rationality conflicts with collective rationality, so that individuals acting in their own interest compromise the group, leading to an overall outcome that is worst for all. The two principle games which represent the collective problems of environmental issues are (1) the prisoner's dilemma and (2) the tragedy of the commons. The first relates to the problem of the free rider, the second to the problem of individuals maximising their interest in finite conditions.

Explain the relation between social justice issues and environmental problems?
Social structures are obviously deeply intertwine with environmental problems. Some social structures encourage the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources, for example. Problems with social justice - such as the greater influence of the wealthy and the powerful - may lead to a counter-productive consolidation of the status quo (which it may be in the interest of the most powerful to maintain). This means that actions necessary to address environmental problems is severely inhibited. [FOR EXAMPLE]

How does Andrew Light (2000) criticize Eric Katz’s view of restoration?
Katz takes a very dim view of environmental restoration, arguing that it is objectionable on numerous counts, not least due to its duplicity, its arrogance, its expression of human domination of nature, its devaluation of originals and its outright impossibility. Light focusses on criticising Katz's domination argument, which, in short, claims that any restoration project is a manipulation of nature to fit human purposes, so a morally objectionable subjugation of nature. His rebuke is simple and cogent, namely that restoration can take the form of a withdrawal of human interest, a 'retreat' which tries to negate or 'un-do' past activity and allow the natural environment to continue in restored form.

Light also notes how Katz's arguments in general depend upon a dubious ontological premise, that of nature-culture dualism. Reject this, and many of his arguments lose their force. Light is keen to sidestep this and other metaphysical debates by adopting a pragmatist view, which evaluates restoration in terms of its practical consequences. He finds that restoration practices in general do help us restore our relationship with nature, cultivate a culture of nature respect, and improve natural conditions in line with their stated intentions. This is true, he notes, whether or not the restored environment has the ontological status of an artifact.

References:
Light, A (2000), 'Ecological Restoration and the Culture of Nature', in Restoring Nature: Perspectives from the Social Sciences and Humanities, (eds.) P. Gobster and B. Hall (Washington: Island Press)

Introduction to Environmental Aesthetics

What are the main reasons for the neglect of natural beauty in aesthetics according to Ronald Hepburn?
Loss of faith in natures intelligibility and its ultimate endorsement of human visions and aspirations. No longer is nature the sublime product of God, no longer can nature offer comfort.

What are the main differences between art and nature when it comes to aesthetic appreciation?
Boundaries of traditional art are normally clear; not in nature. Traditional art has an intentional creator. Traditional art is clearly seperate from subject. Subject exists within nature / natural scenes. There is far more contingency in nature, less stability.

What are the main characteristics of a cognitive approach in the aesthetics of nature?
Cognitive approach tries to ground aesthetic appreciation of nature in terms of the natural sciences and common sense knowledge, much as the aesthetic appreciation of art is grounded, according to them, in knowledge derived from art critics and historians. Aesthetic appreciation of nature consists in responding to recognitions about the way nature actually is. The cognitive approach to aesthetics tends to be accompanied by a realist or objectivist view which claims there are objective aesthetic truths, and that aesthetic contemplation aims at forming judgements concerning these. Carlson (2008) is a well known proponent of this view.

What are the main characteristics of a non-cognitive approach in the aesthetics of nature?
A non-cognitive approach to the aesthetics of nature tends to emphasis the emotional, imaginative and immersive aspects of a natural-aesthetic engagement. It will not take aesthetic engagement with nature to be primarily or exclusively intellectual, but rather to be in significant part more primordial, involving perception, emotion, imagination and thought. It will tend to stress indeterminacy, and is generally not accompanied by an aesthetic realism which claims that there are objective aesthetic truths (though Saito may be an exception to this). Hepburn (1966), Berleant (1992), Heyd (2001) and Saito (1996) hold versions of the non-cognitive view. On the immersiveness of natural-aesthetic experiene, Berleant (1992) writes that our environment:

'is transformed into a realm in which we live as participants, not observers... the aesthetic mark of all such times is not disinterested contemplation but total engagement, a sensory immersion in the natural world that reaches the still uncommon experience of unity'

What is the role of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation of nature according to Allen Carlson (2008)?
It helps us understand how to approach the aesthetic appreciation of nature, by serving to clarify the 'what' and the 'how', that is, what it is that we are engaging with and how we can best do so.

What are Thomas Heyd’s (2001) main criticisms of Carlson’s approach in the aesthetics of nature?
It is too cognitive, too restrictive. There are more relevant factors to aesthetic appreciation, for example emotional and imaginative responses, and crucially, for him, the integration of stories and human assosciations.

Explain what is meant by the pictorial appreciation of natural beauty?
The pictorial appreciation of natural beauty appreciates the formal and compositional qualities of a particular natural scene. It relates to natural beauty in a way analogous to looking at a painting in a museum: the qualities of a fixed scene are admired.

Explain what is meant by the associationist appreciation of natural beauty?
Nature is found beautiful in so far as it is associated with human activity, which is the true object of beauty. Only by having human associations projected onto it does it become beautiful.

Why is the pictorial appreciation of nature problematic from an ecological point of view?
Encourages the creation of viewing platforms and an attention to grand vistas at the expense of the minute, the fragile.

What is the difference between Saito’s (1996) and Carlson’s (2008) cognitive approaches to the appreciation of natural beauty?
Carlson is most concerned with defending a realist / objectivist account according to which there are natural aesthetic truths. Saito rather emphasises the moral need to appreciate nature 'on it's own terms', as it is in itself, independently of human projections. Saito's approach to the appreciation of natural beauty is non-cognitive.

References:
Berleant, A. (1992) ‘The Aesthetics of Art and Nature’ in Landscape, Natural Beauty, and the Arts, Salim Kemal and Ivan Gaskell (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). p. 236

Carlson, A. (2008) 'Aesthetic Appreciation of the Natural Environment' in Nature, Aesthetics and Environmentalism. Allen Carlson and Sheila Lintott (eds.) (New York: Columbia University Press)

Hepburn, R. (1966) 'Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty' in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Berleant & Carlson (eds.) (Broadview Press, 2004)

Heyd, T. (2001) 'Aesthetic Appreciation and the Many Stories about Nature' in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments, Berleant & Carlson (eds.) (Broadview Press, 2004)

Saito, Y. (1996) 'Appreciating Nature on Its Own Terms' in The Aesthetics of Natural Environments, Berleant & Carlson (eds.) (Broadview Press, 2004)

Henry David Thoreau

In what sense is philosophy and economy related according to Thoreau?
For Thoreau, economy is synonymous with philosophy. He broadens the meaning of the term 'economy' to incorporate all aspects of practical living. For example, he redefines 'cost' to mean 'the amount of life which is required to be exchanged for something.' Thoreau's 'poor' are those who try to solve the problem of a livelihood by a formula more complicated than the problem itself.

Páll Skúlason

What are the three main aspects of the living creature?
Activity (creativity), passivity (receptivity) and synthesis - deliberation and planning.

What distinguishes the human animal from other living creatures?
Highly developed brain, high capacity for synthesis.

What are the main characteristics of the human reason?
Planning, abstract thought, logical deduction, decision making, flexibility, (?) non-instrumental reflection.

What characterizes the subjective view of nature?
Nature as external to mind - an object for us. Nature as source of values, subject as passive. [EXPAND]

How is the distinction between nature and culture conceived according to the subjective view?
Culture is man's capacity to transcend nature: nature is body, the objective, while culture is spirit or soul, the essence of the subject. Culture seems to hold a strange non-natural status on this account.

What characterizes the practical view of nature?
We struggle with nature, we seek to exploit it. Nature is the origin of worldly values, human as creative origin of intellectual and moral values. [EXPAND]

How is the distinction between nature and culture conceived according to the practical view?
Nature as enemy. Culture as a technical construction

What characterizes the moral view of nature?
We need to reconcile ourselves with nature, nature as origin of moral values. [EXPAND]

How is the distinction between nature and culture conceived according to the moral view?
Nature as foundation for human life, persisting independently of it. Culture as a human cultivation of nature. Culture proximately dependent upon humanity.

In what sense can Askja be said to be a symbol of the earth?
Askja is a remote space of wilderness. Barren and hostile, it symbolises the independence of the earth from humanity, its implacable longevity. Skulason (2008) writes that it represents: “objective reality, independent of all thought, belief and expression, independent of human existence”.

Skulason writes that coming to Askja was like realising for the first time his status as an earthling, recognising the earth as the fundamental premise for his existence, for all thought. Here we talk of earth not as determinate concept, but as the indeterminable exteriority, the precondition for all conceptualising. Askja reminds us how all human totalities are dependent upon this non-human totality, the totality of Nature.

What characterizes the relationship between the mind and the world?
Skúlason: uncertainty, insecurity, which arises from the doubts and ambiguity at the fringes of conceptual thought. Skúlason seems to take consciousness to extend beyond conceptual thought.

Why may it be dangerous to view nature as a mechanical system?
To do so may be to rashly reify our self-constructed interpretative systems, to regard nature as intrinsically intelligible according to our conceptual frameworks. It is to take the constitution of nature to be conceptual, so to open up the possibility of a theory of everything which captures the essence of nature. This is an optimistic - perhaps idealistic - assumption.

I wonder if the most dangerous result of this approach is the heady sense of intellectual optimism that results. If the whole of nature can be subsumed within the sphere of rational frameworks, then all otherness can be reduced to the same. Normativity seems to vanish in a mechanistic system,  intellectual and moral values become a mere epiphenomenon. But in this case, we have forgotten about ourselves as creators of the system, who could not do so without some kind of normative motivation in the first place. So system thinking can lead to the neglect of subjectivity. [ I want to think this through further, perhaps re-read Husserl on the mathematisaiton of nature... ]

How do we distinguish between worldly, mental and moral values?
Worldly values: economic, political - external
Mental values: games, science, art - internal
Moral values: justice, love, freedom, good judgement - inter-subjective

What is meant by a spiritual understanding of nature?
This is highly debated. In many cases I worry that 'spiritual' is a not helpful word because of its mystical and religious connotations. The more palatable sense which spiritual invokes is the one 'not concerned with material values or pursuits'; an understanding that is more than just instrumental or pragmatic. One which incorporates what Skúlason refers to as mental and moral values, those initiating values that direct our instrumental endeavours. A spiritual understanding of nature may be somewhat non-cognitive, grounded in intuitions, emotions, and lived-experiences, such as the enounter with Askja.

What is involved in the experience of the “numinous”?
Writes Skúlason: 'the experience of the numinous... is an experience that does not fit into any system of ideas but shows the superficiality and smallness of all such systems.' He takes it to be a pre-intellectual or non-cognitive experience of the absolute exteriority of nature (Hegelian sense). The experience of the numinous is awe-inspiring, overwhelming, even terrifying. Skúlason takes his encounter with Askja to be an example of the experience of the numinious.

What of the origin of this experience? Skúlason understands it as a basic intuition which can be brought about by special types of experience, bearing a similar status, perhaps, to Kant's a priori intuitions.

References:
Skúlason, P. (2008) 'On the Spiritual Understanding of Nature', (unpublished?)

Deep Ecology

What is the distinction between shallow and deep ecology and in what sense is Deep Ecology “deep” according to the theory itself?
So called 'shallow' ecology taken to be conservative and superficial. It fails to take into account spiritual considerations, thinks firmly within the bounds of capitalism and only in terms of instrumental value. It is anthropocentric: considering the natural world valuable only in the context of human concerns. Deep Ecology tries to take a 'spiritual perspective', which is more reflective, less anthropocentric, and more apt to consider long term implications. Importantly, it aims to present a comprehensive religious and philosophical world view: not just a set of prescriptions about how to interact with the environment.

What are the three main versions of deep ecology?
The three main versions of deep ecology differ primarily according to the entities to which they ascribe moral standing.

Bio-centric: places value upon every living organism. [e.g. Arnie Naess, Bill Deval and George Sessions]

Eco-centric: places value on ecosystems (a biological community of interacting organisms and their environment) (e.g. Leopold)

Land-centric: places value on land, that is, to non-animate matter, it being the origin of everything animate. (e.g. Leopold, Saitlo)

State and explain the two ultimate norms of Deep Ecology.
The two basic norms of Deep Ecology are (1) Self-realization and (2) Bio-centric equality. These norms were apparently arrived at by Naess after a 'deep questioning process', they are 'underivable'. 

The first refers to the 'realization of self in Self', which is to say, the realisation of the individual self in the context of the whole, the overcoming of the individual ego in favour of a broader ecological consciousness in which one is recognised as part of an all-encompassing unity. This is a familiar idea - I recognise it in Hegel and in (my limited comprehension of) Buddhism.

The second norm argues that all entites in the biosphere have an equal right to live and flourish. As part of the whole, all organisms are equal in intrinsic worth. If we harm anything, we harm ourselves - we are the unity. The logic of the second norm is easily reduced to absurdity: can we seriously ascribe equal importance to every living organism, including pests and virusses such as AIDS?

If bio-centric equality tries to overcome anthropocentrisim, why not stop there? Why is bio-centricism any better? What about inanimate matter?

What are the eight basic principles of Deep Ecology?
As outlined by Naess, the eight basic principles of Deep Ecology are pretty vague. They can be read as a hodge-podge of platitudes or as a series of highly controversial, perhaps even ludicrous, claims. It's a shame I read the extract by Deval and Session (1985) so early on because its outrageous pseudo-scholarship completely discredited the label 'deep ecology' for me, leading me to initially disregard some of the more interesting thinkers associated with the movement. I remain, nevertheless, uneasy about the label; the extract from their book read more like a proselytising quasi-religious pamphlet than an academic piece, and the shameless use of 'spiritual' and 'deep' to give a sense of profundity to the ideas was really surpising. On first reading, I couldn't believe the article was included in an academic anthology. I then remembered that this is a course in applied philosophy, and that perhaps it was included as a 'primary source' - e.g. an indication of the kind of thinking/writing found in real world environmental movements.

       1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have intrinsic value. [bio-centric equality]
       2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves.
       3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital human needs.
       4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease.
       5. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
       6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
       7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.
       8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.

References:
Devall, B. & Sessions, G. (1985) Deep Ecology (Salt Lake: Peregrine Smith)

Aldo Leopold

Explain Aldo Leopold’s ecological view of morality?
According to Leopold, morality is a limitation on the sphere of physically possible action in the struggle for existence. Morality is a natural phenomena which evolves along with social structures. The sphere of moral consideration has expanded dramatically during the course of human history; we should now think about expanding it even further, to include many animate and even non-animate aspects of nature. Leopold does not advocate a loony 'equality' principle, merely a recognition of duties towards the environment. But 'Our duties to the land demand we take care of its interests'.
Core principle:
'“A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community, it is wrong when it tends otherwise”

What does it mean to “think like a mountain”?
This is a simile to represent the idea of thinking holistically, about ecosystems rather than individuals. To think in terms of the manifold perspectives of all the individuals that make up the system, and to think of the system as a whole.

How does the land ethic envisage a change in the role of man?
To develop an emotional and spiritual relationship to nature, one which allows us to value in manifold ways, not just economically. 'a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it”(p.204). Man would develop a sense of responsibilty towards his surroundings.

Introduction to Ethics of Nature

What are the main practical issues and topics in the field of environmental ethics?
Environmental ethics encompasses both practical issues and philosophical questions concerning our relationship to the environment. The particular, practical issues arise due to our interactions with the environment, the effects we have upon it, and it upon us. Key debates include: environmental preservation and conservation, the mitigation of harm to other species and the non-animate environment which results from human activity, and the exploitation of natural resources. These issues give rise to more abstract philosophical questions which concern broadly (1) the concept of nature, (2) our relationship to nature, (3) the value of nature.

What are the main characteristics of 1) animal liberation movement, 2) ecofeminism and 3) ecological humanism?
(1) Animal liberationists, most famously Singer, argue that individual animals of a certain sophistication are worthy of moral consideration.
(2) Ecofeminists draw comparisons between humanities' relationship to nature and men's relationship to women. Both exhibit a relationship of domination and exploitation thinly veiled by a self-justifying ideology.
(3) Ecological humanists take human beings to be the key source of moral consideration, but emphasise their connectedness with nature, and the derivative importance of respecting nature out of concern for human beings.

What are the main characteristics of 1) the natural world, 2) the social world and 3) the world of the mind?
Pall Skúlason makes the following characterisations:

(1) Natural world: Independent of humans, objective, material, the container in which humans live, shared between individuals yet in some sense inaccessible.
(2) Social world: Dependent upon humans, shared between individuals, meaningful, linguistic, institutional, economic political and communicative systems
(3) World of Mind: Personal, individual, meaningful, somewhat incommensurable, consciousness, experience, systematic, subjective

What is the difference between conservation and preservation?
Conservation is about sustainable use and management of natural resources, which focusses on the needs of humans and accepts development as long as its not wasteful. It is anthropocentric and pragmatic, grounding questions about our relationship to the environment in the context of our responsibilities to other people. Preservation, in contrast, aims to maintain areas in a particular condition - so, nature reserves, for example. It is often motivated by the desire to protect against human interference, to allow nature to self-realize, to render the temporal more permenant. It is sometimes accompanied by a nature-culture dualism (e.g. Katz). But it may be supported by pragmatists too.

Introduction to this study journal

I've decided to keep a study journal for this course. The first few entries will be based upon my short responses to the sample questions for our mid-term. Firstly though, I will write a bit about my expectations for this course. This is based on what I said in the first lecture.

I am a third year undergraduate studying single honours philosophy. I think this is really the first time I am taking a course in applied philosophy. I am looking forward to getting a taste of the way philosophical theorising can interact with and inform practical and political engagement, and vice versa. I have often felt a hesitancy to actively engage with real world issues, wishing to first 'think things through' to a reasonable degree. My unwillingness to engage actively with student politics at Sussex has primarily arisen from uncertainty; the feeling that, really, I don't have a clue what the answers to the debated problems are, or even whether what is being presented as a problem is actually such. I certainly want to participate in active political engagement at some point, but I want to be able to conduct my activity in a reasonably well informed manner.

Of course, I often wonder just how well informed it needs to be - that is to say, when it will be time put down the textbooks and to start a more active engagement? Of course there will never be a time to completely stop studying theory, but rather perhaps a period in which to give less time to this and more  to practical activity. I hope this course will help me reflect upon this question. I am particularly looking forward to the non-theoretical lecturers some of which will be given by environmental activists. I will be interested to see how their activities are informed by their philosophical views (if at all), and in a broad sense gain an understanding of just how important their theoretical training turns out to be. Also, I'm looking forward to reflecting further upon the possibility of non-instrumental value...